Obviously, the initiators of the Israeli agreements believe that the current Israeli reality requires such an agreement and that it is the best available. According to them, the agreement encourages couples who plan not to marry after Halacha or to live together without marriage to marry in a Halachian ceremony. Footnote 71 They also seem to understand that the dispute between them and their adversaries depends primarily on whether the reality in Israel requires renouncing the “smooth” position, as Rabbi Dichovsky calls it, and whether changes in the social reality of the people of Israel are a consideration in the determination of Halacha in this matter. This is what Rabbi Avraham Stav has to say: 16 The agreement has undergoen several transformations, and I am referring here only to its final version. It is very likely that if they do not agree, the answer is yes. But when they do, their situation definitely seems better than that of Israeli women. The likelihood that Israeli women will be disadvantaged is even higher for those who do not resort to a “classic” ground for divorce against the husband, which requires him to provide a subsidy. Footnote 145 Even if they have such a ground, in many cases they get it faster than their Israeli counterparts, who have the same reason, because the agreement is activated immediately and automatically and does not require a court judgment imposing a divorce (as well as sanctions) – decisions that can take years. Footnote 146 In addition, Jewish-American women who have reached an agreement know in advance the policy of the rabbinical court that will divorce, which is not possible in Israel.

Footnote 147 The answer to the opening question of this paragraph is more complex than is usually claimed. It would be fair to present the effect of civil law as equivalent to the creation of a bediavad state that requires leniency with regard to the grounds for divorce to avoid Mamzerut, etc., whereas in Israel, where there is no fear of a civil divorce, it is possible to act according to strict Jewish law, and there is no reason, Indulgence. We have seen that the issue is so presented by rabbinical judges in Israel, for example by Rabbi Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, who expressly stated that considerations of guilt should be part of the agreement, but that in the United States they must be renounced because there is no alternative. Footnote 80 The U.S. decision commander, Rabbi David Bleich, also presented the issue in the same way in his proposed agreement and stated that there would be differences between the U.S. and Israel. Footnote 81 According to him, if there is an agreement in Israel, he should find that a woman who voluntarily leaves her husband does not receive the spouse`s help indicated in the agreement, because that is what Halacha says: and in Israel, it is not possible not to marry after Halacha . . .